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Abstract
In 1986 the International Journal of Epidemiology published "Identifiability, Exchangeability and
Epidemiological Confounding". We review the article from the perspective of a quarter century
after it was first drafted and relate it to subsequent developments on confounding, ignorability, and
collapsibility.
Introduction
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, we published an article
titled "Identifiability, exchangeability and epidemiologi-
cal confounding" [1], hereafter IEEC. At the request of the
editor of the present journal, we review the article in light
of the extensive developments since that time. In brief, the
article gave a formal definition of confounding and a log-
ical justification for correct intuitions about confounding
that existed before. Among its deficiencies were that it
failed to give adequate historical context and it was not
general enough in its discussion. Greater generality was
achieved in subsequent articles, especially "Confounding,
collapsibility, and causal inference" [2] - which in some
ways was an expansion and extension of IEEC addressed
to a statistical audience - and in the less technical epide-
miologic article, "Estimating causal effects" [3].
Since then, some brief histories of confounding have
appeared [4-7]. There have been many conceptual and
technical developments as well; below we will cite a few
of them that have been the focus of our research in recent
decades.
Confounding Discussions Before IEEC
Confounding Before the 1980s
Like nearly all work before the 1980s, IEEC dealt only
with estimating effects of exposure histories that could be
captured adequately by a single summary, such as
"exposed" and "unexposed." IEEC is in some ways no
more than a logical finale to a long history of develop-
ment regarding simple exposures. Concepts of confound-
ing can be traced far back, e.g., John Stuart Mill discussed
issues of confounded comparisons in his famed treatise
on inductive logic [8]; so did Yule (p. 134) [9] under the
heading of "fictitious association." The key concepts were
well known to many observational researchers in sociol-
ogy and epidemiology long before we entered the field
(e.g., [10-14]), although not always under the rubric of
"confounding" - "spurious association" was a common
term for the same idea.
Regardless of terms, confounding is the problem of con-
fusing or mixing of exposure effects with other "extrane-
ous" effects: If at the time of its occurrence, exposure was
associated with pre-existing risk for the outcome, its asso-
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ciation would reflect at least in part the effect of this base-
line association, not the effect of exposure itself. The
portion of the association reflecting this baseline associa-
tion was called confounding or "spurious association."
The factors responsible for this confounding (those pro-
ducing the differences in baseline risk) were called con-
founders.
A few issues were not completely clear to some practition-
ers. One problem was that many researchers were inclined
to overlook the pre-existing  (baseline) proviso in the
description. It was not unusual to see causal intermediates
(causes of disease affected by exposure) treated as con-
founders; unfortunately, this practice adjusts away part of
the very effect under study and can induce selection bias
even under the null hypothesis of no direct, indirect, or
overall effect of exposure. This problem was especially
common in cardiovascular research, where studies of diet
and lifestyle often adjusted for clinical measurements
(blood pressure, serum cholesterol, etc.) taken after the
behaviors in question. Apparently, exhortations against
adjustment for post-exposure variables in randomized
experiments (e.g., [15]) had not effectively filtered from
experimental statistics into epidemiology.
To explain the problem, a number of authors (e.g., [14,16-
18]) illustrated and contrasted confounders with interme-
diates using causal diagrams (then known as path dia-
grams). IEEC used a different mode of illustration, one
imported from experimental statistics: The potential-out-
comes model.
Potential Outcomes
The potential-outcomes model of causation, also known
as the response-schedule or "counterfactual" model, was
first formalized by Neyman in 1923 [19] (who soon there-
after teamed with Egon Pearson to develop the theories of
alpha-level testing and confidence intervals). Of primary
interest in IEEC, the model supplied justifications for a
number of intuitions about epidemiologic confounding
that existed before the 1980s, as well as the nonintuitive
ideas that randomization did not guarantee absence of
confounding [20], and that confounding did not corre-
spond fully to the statistical notion of noncollapsibility
[21]. Thus the model is worth reviewing in detail.
As described in many articles and books (e.g., [22-26]),
the model encodes causal statements by assigning to each
study unit (whether a person, cohort, or population) a dif-
ferent outcome variable for each exposure level. For a
binary exposure indicator X, the familiar "Y" of associa-
tional (noncausal) regression analysis is replaced by a pair
of variables Y1, Y0 representing the unit's outcome when
exposed and the unit's outcome when not exposed,
respectively: Y1 is the outcome when X = 1, Y0 is the out-
come when X = 0. Unit-level effects are differences or
ratios of these exposure-specific and unit-specific out-
comes. For more general X (including multivariate treat-
ments, wherein X is a vector or even more complex), Yx
represents the outcome if X = x. As did IEEC, for simplicity
we will focus on the binary X case, noting that our com-
ments apply generally.
With this model, the problem of causal inferences
devolves to how one can identify these effects when for
each unit at most one of the outcomes can be observed. In
other words: How can we estimate an effect such as Y1-Y0
when we cannot observe both Y1, Y0 at once? Strong
assumptions are needed. Randomization was a natural
assumption for experimental research, and by the 1930s
the potential-outcomes model was established in experi-
mental statistics (e.g., [27]), although without that name.
It was sometimes called the "randomization model" [28];
nonetheless, randomization was an assumption for its
use, not intrinsic to the model itself, and by the 1970s the
model was being used for nonrandomized studies.
Rubin [29,30] introduced the term "potential outcomes"
and formalized a set of assumptions that identified aver-
age causal effects within the model. An important part of
Rubin's formulation was to link the causal-inference
problem to the missing-data problem in surveys: Under
the model, at least one of the potential outcomes is miss-
ing. IEEC however was based instead on the formulation
spelled out by Copas (p. 269) [28], which had been com-
mon currency in studies of randomization-based statistics
before the 1970s (e.g., [27,31]). IEEC never used the term
"potential outcome" or cited Rubin's work, which at the
time was not familiar (nor apparently to the reviewers).
This lapse was rectified in later updates (e.g., [2-4,23]).
The potential-outcomes model has often caused conster-
nation because it treats the potential outcomes Y1 and Y0
as if they were baseline covariates, fixed from the start of
follow-up. The only possible effect of exposure is then on
whether we see Y1 or Y0. In other words, the exposure sta-
tus X of a unit is unrelated to each potential outcome of the
unit; exposure only determines which potential outcome
we may observe. If exposure occurs (X = 1), we may
observe Y1 but not Y0; if exposure doesn't occur (X = 0), we
may observe Y0 but not Y1. The unobservable potential
outcome (Y0 if X = 1, Y1 if X = 0) is sometimes called coun-
terfactual (contrary to fact). This name is inaccurate under
the strictest formulations of the model, because each
potential outcome is presumed to be conceivable regard-
less of the exposure history, and its value may be the
actual outcome regardless of the actual exposure history.
For example, if a person's potential outcomes are Y1 = 1,
Y0 = 1 where Y is a death indicator, the person's actual out-
come is death regardless of exposure; only the unrealizedEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:4 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/4
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exposure  history ("exposed" when no exposure occurs;
"not exposed" when exposure occurs) is counterfactual.
These somewhat odd features helped inspire vigorous
attacks on the model (e.g., see the comments following
Maldonado and Greenland [3]), but those were not
accompanied by evidence that the model gave misleading
results in any real example. On the contrary, the idea of
potential outcomes fixed at baseline brings a certain trans-
parency to and supplies logical justification for many
accepted statistical procedures [27,28,31-34].
One limitation of IEEC, shared with most descriptions of
potential outcomes, was that it confined its discussion to
deterministic Y1 and Y0 (which were taken to be binary
indicators). There is nothing essential about this simplifi-
cation, however. Sequels (e.g., [2,35]) made clear that Y1
and Y0 could instead be replaced by potential parameters
θ1 and θ0 of outcome distributions to allow for stochastic
outcomes. And, as could Y1 and Y0, θ1 and θ0 could be vec-
tors or more complex structures.
Another shortcoming of IEEC (shared by most of the liter-
ature on causation in epidemiology, especially the graph-
ical literature) is that it did not emphasize the importance
of limiting the exposure X to a potentially changeable con-
dition, in order to make sense of the unobserved potential
outcomes [36,37]. Importantly, this shortcoming was not
shared by other articles appearing at the time [38,39].
Unfortunately, Holland's famous description thoroughly
botched the model's history, misattributing it to Rubin.
Confounding, Collapsibility, and Exchangeability
Noncollapsibility of a measure of association over a cov-
ariate means that the measure changes upon stratification
by the covariate; stated in reverse, it means we get a differ-
ent measure if we collapse over (ignore) the covariate. As
the above citations noted, noncollapsibility by itself could
not imply confounding, since the covariate might be
affected by exposure; the change would then reflect
adjusting away the exposure effect or the creation of selec-
tion bias, rather than any confounding reduction. More
subtly, as noted in IEEC, the change might reflect the
introduction of confounding or selection bias by another,
uncontrolled covariate [1,25,40-43], or it might reflect an
effect of measurement error rather than confounding [44].
And of course the change might reflect only random error
(the hypothesis addressed by collapsibility tests). But
many authors naturally assumed that, absent these phe-
nomena, any change must reflect removal of confounding
by the covariate.
Miettinen and Cook [21] argued that this was not true in
general: Some measures (those that were not differences
or ratios of probabilities, such as odds ratios) could
change upon adjustment even if no confounding or other
bias were present. Even more striking, the converse could
hold: confounding by a covariate could be present even if
no change in such measures occurred upon adjustment
for the covariate. Their intuition was lost on many statis-
ticians, who continued to equate confounding with non-
collapsibility. It thus seemed worthwhile to explain the
source of the intuition in a more rigorous manner.
In doing so, the approach in IEEC was to take care to not
define confounding in terms of other covariates. Rather,
the strategy was to show there could be no confounding
(mixing of effects) given "exchangeability" of the groups
being compared (or "comparability", as Miettinen and
Cook called it). The compared groups were said to be
exchangeable with respect to an outcome measure if their
outcomes would be the same whenever they were sub-
jected to the identical exposure history. The groups were
said to be only partially exchangeable if their outcomes
would be the same when they were subjected only to cer-
tain (not necessarily all) exposure histories.
Using a table to contrast the distribution of potential out-
comes in two groups (which we will here label A and B),
IEEC focused on the example of a binary exposure varia-
ble X leading to binary potential-outcome variables Y1
and Y0, where the latter indicate the development of a dis-
ease. In this setting, the average outcome is the incidence
proportion. The two groups would be exchangeable with
respect to all-or-none exposure and average outcome if
they had identical average values of both Y1 and Y0 (i.e.,
identical incidence when subject to the same exposure).
They would thus have the same average outcome if they
were both entirely exposed or if they were both entirely
unexposed. They would be only partially exchangeable if
the average of (say) Y0 was the same for both groups but
the average of Y1 differed between the groups; in that case
they would have the same average outcome when not
exposed but a different average outcome when exposed.
As did Miettinen and Cook, IEEC assumed that interest
focused on comparing the average outcome of an exposed
(X = 1) population A to what that outcome would have
been had the same population not been exposed (X = 0).
We could observe the average of Y1 in A, but not the aver-
age of Y0 in A. We would hope to find or construct a group
B that plausibly had the same average of Y0 as did A, and
was not exposed so that we observe this average. By sub-
stituting the average of Y0 in B for the average of Y0 in A,
we could now take the difference in the two observable
quantities (the average of Y1 in A and the average of Y0 in
B) as our measure of effect of exposure in A. But, if the Y0
average in B did not equal that in A, simply pretending the
two were equal would create a bias in our estimate of the
effect of exposure in A. That bias is what IEEC called con-Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:4 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/4
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founding, since it mixed "baseline" differences in A and B
(i.e., the difference in the Y0 averages in A and B) with the
desired effect (the difference of the Y1 and Y0 averages in
A).
As discussed subsequently to IEEC [2,3,6,24], the con-
cepts generalize immediately to situations in which X = 1
and X = 0 represent two different exposure distributions or
population (group-level) interventions for the target popula-
tion A, to situations in which the outcome of interest is
something other than an average, and to situations in
which the target A is observed under neither pattern of
interest. In the latter situations, observable substitutes
must be found for the outcome of A under X = 1 and the
outcome of A under X = 0, perhaps from subsets of A (as
in randomized trials) or from entirely different popula-
tions. Failure of these substitutes to equal the target out-
comes would normally lead to bias, which again we
would call confounding.
Induced Confounding and Illusory Confounding
Control of intermediates (often called mediators  in the
social-science literature) is sometimes promoted as a strat-
egy to estimate effects transmitted through pathways not
involving the intermediates. Judd and Kenny ([45], p.
608-609) noted that, even in randomized trials, this strat-
egy could be biased by failure to control for factors that
affect both the intermediates and the outcome of interest.
Robins [39] and Robins and Greenland [46] extended the
potential-outcomes framework of IEEC to illustrate this
problem, and provided no-confounding criteria for esti-
mating direct effects; see also Pearl ([47], sec. 4.2). The
problem is much more easily seen using causal diagrams,
where it can be described as confounding induced by
opening noncausal (biasing) paths between the exposure
and the outcome due to conditioning on the intermediate
[48-50].
As mentioned earlier, IEEC and the companion paper by
Robins and Greenland [40] noted that confounding can
be induced by control of baseline covariates. Again, dia-
grams better show how this confounding arises by open-
ing noncausal paths between the exposure and the
outcome [25,41,49,51]. The practical importance of the
phenomenon may be limited apart from special situa-
tions [52]. Nonetheless, the examples show why one can-
not be sure that confounding is being reduced as one
adjusts for additional confounders and sees the estimate
change: Even if the confounders satisfy the usual condi-
tions for being a confounder and there is no other bias, it
is theoretically possible that the change represents an
increase in confounding.
There are other problems with examining changes in esti-
mates to judge whether confounding is being controlled.
One is that, for a common outcome, changes in odds
ratios and (to a lesser extent) rate ratios may largely reflect
noncollapsibility rather than confounding removal
[2,24]. Another is that adjustment may induce changes in
estimates solely by increasing sparse-data bias, leading to
a misimpression that confounding is being reduced [53]
(p.525).
Epidemiologic Confounding, Randomization, and 
Ignorability
In statistics, the word "confounding" has often been used
to describe related but different concepts, and does not
even play a central role in many statistical discussions of
causal inference (e.g., in the theory of experimental
design, where "confounding" refers to an intentional
design strategy). Instead, assumptions of no confounding
are replaced by randomization  or else by ignorability
assumptions. Ignorability assumptions are sometimes
called "no unmeasured confounding" assumptions, even
though this usage differs from the usual epidemiologic
meaning of "no confounding" (although in very large
samples the two are equivalent in practical terms).
Randomization and Ignorability
Simple (complete) randomization of exposure means that
exposure events occur independently of every event that
precedes their occurrence. In particular, because the
potential outcomes already exist at the times of exposure
events, it implies that exposure events occur independ-
ently of the potential outcomes of interest. The latter inde-
pendence condition is often called an ignorability
assumption [32]; that is, ignorability is a narrowing of the
randomization assumption to the specific outcome under
study. For example, weak ignorability for a binary expo-
sure event (X = 1 or X = 0) says exposure events occur inde-
pendently of each  potential outcome Y1 and Y0;  strong
ignorability says exposure events occur independently of
the pair of potential outcomes (Y1, Y0). Strong ignorability
implies weak ignorability, and randomization implies
them both; thus any nonignorability implies lack of rand-
omization. Each of these conditions may also be defined
conditionally on some set of covariates (e.g., strong ignor-
ability conditional on age and sex).
Ignorability of exposure events (X levels) with respect to a
pair of potential outcomes Y1, Y0 says X occurs independ-
ently of Y1 and Y0. This property makes X independent of
any function of Y1 or Y0 (e.g., their logs). It follows that the
subpopulation defined by X = 1 and the subpopulation
defined by X = 0 would be exchangeable with respect to
any function or summary of the potential outcomes (e.g.,
the mean of Y1, the mean of Y0, or their geometric means).
Thus it seemed (and still seems) to many statisticians that
there should be no confounding of any measure, once we
are given the ignorability condition.Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:4 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/4
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Given a causal diagram for the data-generating process
under study, we may ask if we can unbiasedly estimate the
effect of X on Y conditional on a set of covariates Z in the
diagram. It turns out that is the case if Z satisfies the back-
door criterion of Pearl [51,54], which implies ignorability
of X events with respect to (Y1, Y0) given Z. Pearl however
refers to this condition as "no confounding" [25]; as dis-
cussed next, this usage diverges from our usage of "no
confounding" in IEEC and at various points since
[2,6,55].
Randomization and Ignorability versus No Confounding
There is a discrepancy between the concepts of randomi-
zation and ignorability as defined in statistics and the con-
cepts of no confounding and exchangeability as defined
in IEEC and in Robins and Morgenstern [55]. To maintain
conformity with traditional usage, IEEC defined nonex-
changeability and hence confounding in terms of the
actual rather than probabilistic exposure associations with
potential outcomes. Thus confounding can be present
even if the exposure assignment mechanism is completely
random.
To see this problem, suppose the outcome is 10-year mor-
tality and the compared groups differ by baseline age and
sex. Then it is almost certain some confounding is present,
because age and sex differences will almost certainly lead
to mortality differences, and those differences are not due
to exposure. As noted in IEEC, it does not matter if expo-
sure was randomized or otherwise assigned in an ignora-
ble manner; once the assignment is made and the groups
are created, any outcome differences between them will be
confounded (mixed) with exposure effects
[2,17,20,21,55-58].
Why do randomization and ignorability fail to capture
no-confounding assumptions in epidemiology and soci-
ology? Because randomization and ignorability refer only
to the mechanism that generates exposure events, not to
the product of that mechanism. An ignorable mechanism
may by chance leave some degree of confounding in any
exposure assignment it makes. As has long been recog-
nized, most assignments made by actual ignorable mech-
anisms (such as simple randomizers) will have some
degree of confounding in the sense of mixing of effects
(e.g., [56]). Analytic adjustment for baseline covariates
can remove confounding by those covariates, but will
leave confounding by unadjusted covariates. This prob-
lem is sometimes called one of "unmeasured confound-
ing" but remains a problem whether the covariate is
measured or not; what matters is whether it is adjusted in
a manner that removes confounding by the covariate and
that does not introduce more confounding.
As the size of the randomized groups in a given trial
increases, randomization does make it ever less probable
that substantial confounding remains. This feature reflects
a key statistical advantage flowing from successful rand-
omization: The confidence limits capture uncertainty
about the confounding left by randomization [33,55]. In
this sense, randomization-based confidence limits
account for concerns about residual baseline confounding
by unmeasured factors in randomized trials, although
post-randomization events (such as censoring) may
reintroduce these concerns. Note that other statistical
aspects of the trial (e.g., number of participants, power)
do not enter into these considerations except through
confidence limits, so that a trial that is "large" and "pow-
erful" may nonetheless be poorly informative because it
produced a wide confidence interval.
Adjustment for Baseline Covariates under an Ignorable Mechanism
As noted above, there have been many intuitive and math-
ematical arguments as to why adjustment for baseline
covariates can be important, even with an ignorable expo-
sure-assignment mechanism such as randomization (e.g.,
[17,20,21,55,57-59]). This importance is reflected by the
fact that in propensity-score (exposure-probability)
adjustment for confounding, adjustment by the fitted
score provides better frequency properties than the true
score [32,60]. For example, under simple 50% randomi-
zation to exposure, the true propensity score is constant
across all individuals (it is 0.5, the chance of being
assigned to exposure); its use thus produces no adjust-
ment at all, since everyone will end up in the same score
stratum. In contrast, a fitted score will adjust for the cov-
ariates it includes, although the extent of that adjustment
may depend heavily on the form of the propensity model.
In sum, randomization (or more generally, ignorability)
does not impose "no confounding" in the common-sense
use of the term. Rather, it provides the following related
properties [1,33,55,58]:
1) Unconditional expected confounding of zero: This is a
pre-allocation expectation, corresponding to no asymp-
totic bias over the randomization distribution; but once
allocation occurs, it becomes secondary to properties of
the allocation.
2) A randomization-based ("objective") derivation of a
prior for residual  confounding  after conditioning on all
measured confounders. This prior applies after allocation as
well as before, and becomes more narrowly centered
around zero as the sample size increases. This is a key
post-allocation benefit of randomization.
As emphasized by R.A. Fisher [61], it also provides a ran-
domization-based distribution for conducting frequentist
inference on effects [62]; property (2) can be viewed as a
Bayesian version of this property [58].Epidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:4 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/4
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Exchangeability in IEEC and Subjective Probability Theory
Property (2) above was the basis for IEEC tying the epide-
miologic concept of confounding to the subjective-Baye-
sian concept of exchangeability. In probability, random
variables are said to be exchangeable (under a given joint
distribution) if they can be interchanged (permuted) in
any statement without altering the probability of the state-
ment [63]. For example, if we consider U and V exchange-
able with joint probability distribution Pr(U, V), the
probabilities Pr(U<V) and Pr(V<U) derived from Pr(U, V)
must be equal. Exchangeable random variables are in
essence indistinguishable with regard to our bets about
their values (whether absolutely or relative to one
another). Note that exchangeability is a property of the
joint distribution of the variables. In subjective probabil-
ity systems, different observers may have different views
on whether the variables are exchangeable because they
may assign different distributions to variables.
In IEEC, the random variables at issue are the distribu-
tions of potential outcomes in the compared groups A and
B, and the discussion focused on a binary deterministic
outcome. To describe the situation more generally (as in
[2]) for a binary exposure X, let U1A and U0A be some sum-
mary of the outcomes in group A when everyone in A is
exposed (X = 1) and when everyone in A is unexposed (X
= 0); similarly for group B, let U1B and U0B be the summa-
ries when everyone in group B is exposed and when every-
one is unexposed. X might be an individual exposure (e.g.,
carbohydrate consumption) or a group-level exposure
(e.g., legislation, insurance). Further, assume that what
happens in each group has no effect on what happens in
the other, but that U0A and U0B are exchangeable given
U1A. Then in drawing inferences about the effect of expo-
sure (of X = 1 vs. X = 0) on A, say U1A-U0A, we could sub-
stitute U0B for U0A.
The Bayesian exchangeability connection provides one
explanation (beyond common-sense and abstruse ancil-
larity arguments) for why we might declare confounding
to be present in a study even though the mechanism that
assigned the exposures was ignorable. Because Bayesians
condition on all the observed data, once we observe an
association of a baseline risk factor with exposure,
exchangeability is lost for us: Upon observing an associa-
tion, we assign different distributions to U0A and U0B,
reflective of the information suggesting a baseline differ-
ence.
Note well that this version of exchangeability is a property
of our information about the groups and the variables,
hence is a subjective (observer-relative) property, not an
absolute (objective) property of either. In this view, eval-
uation of confounding is equally subjective.
Our Research on Confounding Since IEEC
Since IEEC we have separately pursued quite different
paths to deal with problems that involve confounding by
many covariates. Our divergence stems primarily from dif-
ferences in the applied settings and target problems that
have been our focus over the decades since IEEC. None-
theless, it has at times raised a few interesting philosoph-
ical issues, especially when dealing with many exposures
or confounders.
Multiple Exposures as Multiple Confounders
Consider first a study involving single measurements of
multiple exposures, as is common in case-control studies
of occupation and lifestyle. In these settings each exposure
may be a potential confounder for every other exposure,
so it is natural to consider an outcome-regression model
containing all exposures. In conventional theory, this sort
of model could provide an estimate for each exposure
"adjusted" for all the rest. Unfortunately, it often happens
that the number of subjects available may appear large but
is not large enough to produce approximately unbiased
estimates from the usual maximum-likelihood (whether
unconditional, conditional, or partial) or estimating-
equation methods [64]. These problems arise because the
number of subjects needed to get approximate unbiased-
ness grows exponentially with the number of covariates in
the model. In some applications the usual estimators fail
completely due to collinearity [65-67].
One way to address these problems is to accept that (in
observational studies) some bias is unavoidable, and may
even be tolerable in exchange for improved accuracy on
average over all the exposures being considered. The usual
methods then become unacceptable because they can
incur huge bias without a compensating accuracy benefit.
Methods that pursue over-all accuracy improvement
include the vast array of multilevel and hierarchical tech-
niques developed under the headings of ridge regression,
shrinkage (Stein) estimation, penalized estimation, and
empirical and semi-Bayes estimation (see [68] for an ele-
mentary overview). These methods have also been pro-
posed as replacements for conventional variable-selection
procedures in order to avoid the distortions produced by
selection [53,69]. Finally, the methods have been
extended to study the impact of uncontrolled confound-
ing and other biases in observational research [70-73].
Time-Varying Exposures
At the time of IEEC, one of us (Robins) was developing
methods estimating effects of time-varying treatments
from longitudinal data. Early accessible introductions in
this work include Robins [39,62] and Robins et al. [74];
see also Robins et al. [75]. Estimating effects of potentially
complex treatment histories created extreme difficultiesEpidemiologic Perspectives & Innovations 2009, 6:4 http://www.epi-perspectives.com/content/6/1/4
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for likelihood-based methods (which were standard at the
time). These difficulties led to a frequentist approach with
confounder adjustment based on regression of treatment
probabilities on measured confounders (as in propensity-
score methods) followed by use of this fitted treatment
model for adjustment. Fitting is accomplished by semi-
parametric methods such as g-estimation and inverse-
probability-of-treatment (IPT) weighting. These methods
were further extended in many directions, including con-
trol of confounding due to treatment noncompliance
[76], estimation of direct effects [77-79], and to the study
of uncontrolled confounding [80-82].
In the course of this IPT development, it was shown that
familiar likelihood-based methods (including maximum-
likelihood and Bayesian outcome regression) could
exhibit poor large-sample frequency properties if many
covariates needed adjustment and no use was made of
treatment probabilities in fitting [83,84]. These observa-
tions have led to recommendations for doubly robust pro-
cedures that fit outcome regressions using IPT weighting
[85,86]. This approach resembles recommendations that
outcome regressions be conducted after propensity-score
matching has removed gross confounder imbalances
between compared groups [32]. The shared intuition is
that if one of the regression models (for treatment or out-
come) is mis-specified, the resulting adjustment failures
will be compensated for by the adjustment induced by the
other model.
A topic worthy of further research that we have long rec-
ognized but not pursued is how to blend ideas from our
divergent methods and applications. Some applications
of shrinkage-like methods, such as boosting to predict
treatment, appear useful for taming problems due to
unstable weights [87]. One logical next step might be to
apply shrinkage methods to the IPT-weighted outcome
regression as well as to the weight regression. We are not
aware of studies of such "doubly robust double shrink-
age."
Conclusion
Some colleagues have said that they think IEEC is among
the most important methods papers from its era, and it is
often, though not always, cited in reviews of epidemio-
logic confounding, e.g., in Nurminen [7] and Pearl [25]
but not in Vandenbroucke [5]. Regardless of its historical
status, IEEC is a snapshot of a topic in transition. Using a
standard causal model familiar to experimental statisti-
cians since the 1930s, IEEC provided a formal definition
of confounding and logical justifications for traditional
intuitions about confounding graphed in earlier literature
[14,16-18]. It also provided logical justifications for less
intuitive distinctions such as that between confounding
and collapsibility, and that between nonconfounding and
randomization or ignorability.
The terminology in IEEC could have been clearer; for
example, it talked of "causal confounding" without ever
explaining what noncausal confounding would be. The
phrase "causal confounding" was a nod to the fact that
some researchers also talked of "selection confounding,"
in which bias arose because a covariate related to exposure
affected selection rather than disease; today we would
simply call this phenomenon selection bias. There also
could have been a clearer connection made to the topic of
standardization and its relation to the target population
for inference. Nonetheless, the framework in IEEC served
as a basis for many of the more general and more exten-
sive treatments that followed [2,3,33,35,46]. We hope
that its sequels rectified the shortcomings of IEEC, and
that modern readers come away from it feeling equipped
to move on to subsequent literature without too much
difficulty.
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